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CVE-2026-13214 · CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8)

Summary: Stack buffer overflow in OCPP GetConfiguration key parsing

Details

The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contains a stack buffer overflow in parse_getconfig_msg(). When handling a GetConfiguration request from the central system, the handler copied the attacker-controlled JSON "key" string into the caller's fixed 50-byte stack buffer (skey[CISTR50], declared in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c) using an unbounded strcpy(). The parsed key value points directly into the receive buffer, so its length is bounded only by the message size (CONFIG_OCPP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, default 2048).

The GetConfiguration message is delivered over the WebSocket connection that the charge point opens to its configured central system. The reader thread ocpp_wsreader() reads the message into ui->recv_buf and dispatches it to parse_getconfig_msg() via the PDU function table. An attacker who controls the central system endpoint, or a man-in-the-middle on an unencrypted connection, can send a GetConfiguration request whose "key" field exceeds 50 bytes and overflow the reader thread's stack with attacker-chosen bytes.

The consequence is a remotely triggerable stack smash on the OCPP reader thread: at minimum a denial of service, and plausibly remote code execution depending on build-time hardening such as stack canaries and MPU configuration. The fix replaces the strcpy() with a bounded strncpy(key, payload.key[0], CISTR50 - 1) followed by explicit NUL termination, matching the bounded copies already used by the sibling handlers.

Severity

CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8) — vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected packages

  • GIT github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr [3568e1b6d5cdd51a6b964a2a1d6d29200fea2056 – 28af05ca658cbacf745fd5b099566311c58ccb1d] [684c9e8f32e4373a21098559f748f06915f950c9 – dccb09599635bdff17633fa7e9dab014b91dce90]

References