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CVE-2026-64551 · CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)

Summary: sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness

When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the
COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure
of Staleness that follows the cause header:

err = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data);
stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));

err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that
caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is
present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the
4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs
past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb->tail. The value
is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT,
leaking uninitialized memory.

sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so
check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which
reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too
short to hold the staleness field is discarded.

The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into
COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket
in a user and network namespace.

Severity

CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1) — vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

Affected packages

  • GIT git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux [1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 – 6022da37786701df1fc5dd946a6dcba59d5473b1]
  • Linux Kernel [2.6.12 – 5.10.261] [5.11.0 – 5.15.212] [5.16.0 – 6.1.178] [6.2.0 – 6.6.145] [6.7.0 – 6.12.97] [6.13.0 – 6.18.40] [6.19.0 – 7.1.5]

References