Summary: Heym: Command execution via POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools stdio transport: supplied command is spawned before MCP validation
EPSS: 0.6% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days (percentile 50.2).
Details
Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.75, the same POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools endpoint (any authenticated user, lowest role) also accepts the stdio transport, which spawns the attacker-supplied command with attacker-supplied args and an environment merged over os.environ. The process executes on the shared backend host before MCP protocol validation fails — so side effects fire regardless of whether the command speaks MCP. This is a distinct weakness class and exploit primitive from the SSRF (Advisory 2) on the same endpoint, and needs a different fix (role gating / opt-in trust boundary rather than egress controls). This issue has been patched in version 0.0.75.
Severity
HIGH (CVSS 8.8) — vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H